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Abstract
The present paper aims at drawing renewed attention to the relevance of evidential-
ity for Ancient Greek by means of a number of case studies taken from two of Plato’s
works (namely the Apologia Socratis and Crito). First, I briefly identify the concep-
tual framework within which the main analysis of Attic evidential phenomena occurs.
Then, I provide a preliminary overview of (possible) linguistic means used in marking
evidentiality in Ancient Greek (formal aspect). I also explore the way in which eviden-
tial values are conveyed (semantic aspect). Certain Attic particles (e.g., ára, dḗpou),
functional oppositions in complementizing patterns (e.g., hóti vs. hōs), defective ver-
bal forms (e.g., ēmí), and “auxiliaries” (e.g., dokéō) are revealed as evidential markers or
“strategies”. These are able to express inferential, presumptive, reportative, quotative,
visual, and participatory evidentiality. The oblique optative is suggested to have evi-
dential overtones as well. In summary, the paper endeavors to show the importance of
“evidentiality” as an integrative conceptual frame for the descriptive analysis of certain
Ancient Greek phenomena.
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…
φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις
αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης
plato, Sophista 264b
∵
1 Introduction
Speakers of any language are able to express the information source on which
they rely in uttering a certain proposition. The information source is prototyp-
ically encoded by verbalmorphemes.1 For example, if a speaker of Jamul Tiipay
(a Yuma language spoken in Mexico and the United States) notices that one
of his friends is sweating and seems nervous while inventing an implausible
excuse for not paying him back, he will tell you:
(1) tew-ii-kex-a
3sg-lie-infr-emp
‘He must be lying.’
example taken from miller 2001: 192
Based on the attitude of his friend and the implausibility of his account, the
speaker infers that he must be lying (expressed by the suffix -kex). Clearly,
Ancient Greek in general and fourth-century bc Attic in particular do not
have such evidential systems of verbal morphemes. Nevertheless, Attic relies
on other linguistic means to express evidentiality. These include disputed, het-
erogeneous grammatical phenomena (such as particles, contrastive comple-
mentizer constructions, and the oblique optative), for which the conceptual
domain of evidentiality may prove to be a useful integrative approach. There
may be evidential subsystems (e.g., a particle cluster around dḗ and its deriva-
tives dḗpou and dêta; cf. sub 4.1.) and evidential extensions of certain verbal
constructions (consisting of contrasting subsystems; cf. sub 4.2. & 4.3.). More-
over, although it seems that the linguistic encoding of this conceptual domain
can take varying shapes in Ancient Greek, no attempts have beenmade to con-
1 According to De Haan (2013), this is the most frequent formal device for this purpose.
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nect all these (possibly) evidential features through the conceptual domain
of evidentiality. The present paper does not seek to provide a comprehensive
study of evidentiality in Attic, but rather to offer:
i. a concise introduction to the phenomenon of evidentiality and to the
conceptual framework that constitutes the analytical starting point,
ii. a discussion of its relevance to the Ancient Greek language as it appears
in two of Plato’s works (comparable to Cuzzolin’s 2010 exploration of
evidentiality in Latin), and
iii. a number of case studies that consider (possible) evidential morphemes
and strategies, so as to reinterpret some Attic phenomena as (partially)
evidential.
After presenting some provisional conclusions, the paper rounds off with an
outlook for future research. Due to the explorative nature of this contribution,
the discussion of the evidential morphemes and strategies draws on a close
analysis of two texts, the Apologia Socratis and the Crito by Plato (cf. sub
2).
2 The Conceptual Framework of Evidentiality
2.1 Definition
Several definitions of the conceptual domain of evidentiality are available.2 A
majority of scholars would likely agree that evidentiality is the explicit linguis-
tic encoding of the information source on which the speaker relies in uttering
a certain phrase. Evidential markers or strategies make the “evidence” for the
contents of a proposition explicit.
Because evidentiality concerns an epistemic stance toward the contents of
a proposition, it is bound to interfere with epistemic modality (and even with
2 Cf. Diewald-Smirnova (2010: 1). The term “conceptual domain” refers to a certain idea consti-
tuting a coherent entity within human experience that can be encoded linguistically (with
more grammatical and/or more lexical elements). This conceptual domain needs to be care-
fully distinguished from its grammatical realizationbymeansofmorphological systems.Until
very recently, the latter has been the main focus of attention for many linguists studying evi-
dentiality (cf. sub 2.3.). Although evidentiality may be considered a linguistic universal in
that the information source for a proposition can be rendered in every language, eviden-
tial morphemes are as little a universal as temporal morphemes (Aikhenvald 2003: 1 & 2004:
10).
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indirect speech; Volkmann 2005). However, the exact nature of the relation-
ship between these two conceptual domains remains a subject of discussion
(cf. Cornillie 2009; Plungian 2010; studies in Aikhenvald-Dixon 2014). Another
conceptual domain closely linked to evidentiality (and, more specifically, to
inferential markers) is that of “mirativity”, which refers to the semantic field
expressing the speaker’s surprise regarding the information conveyed (Aikhen-
vald 2004: 195–215; see also Feuillet 2006: 333 et sqq. for a discussion of notions
cognate to evidentiality). Evidentiality also interferes with deixis, as eviden-
tial morphemes can “point to” discernable information within the reach of the
speakers and/or hearers (cf., e.g.,Mushin 2001: 33–34; seeAikhenvald 2004: 275–
276 for the deictic origins of certain evidentials). This is, however, not the place
to go further into these matters; they will be touched upon when relevant to
the discussion.
2.2 Classifying Evidential Values: The Semantic Perspective
Drawing largely on Plungian (2010: 37), who, in his turn, elaborated upon Wil-
lett (1988) and Aikhenvald (2004), I used the classification of evidential values
presented in Table 1 to approach the Attic linguistic encoding of evidential-
ity. As is common in semantics, these evidential values are not to be viewed
as clearly demarcated categories, but rather as fields that overlap with one
another (cf. the different, but cognate evidential meanings of dokéō sub 4.7.).
Because evidentiality concerns the signaling of the information source for a
proposition, the sentences that prototypically contain evidential values are of a
declarative nature (although evidentiality can also appear in imperative, inter-
rogative, and other types of clauses; cf. Aikhenvald 2004: 242–256). Therefore, I
focus on declarative sentences.
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table 1 Classification of evidential values according to Plungian (2010: 37)3
direct (ergo personal) - participatory: participation in the action
- endophoric: internal sensation, will
- common knowledge
- sensory
- visual (with subtypes: e.g., close, far,
present, past)
- non-visual: other senses (with subtypes:
e.g., audition)
- revelative: dreams
indirect (a) personal - inferential: deduction based on personally
observed results
- presumptive: deduction based on plausible
reasoning
(b) non-personal - reportative (or hearsay)
- quotative
- common knowledge
The distinction between direct and indirect evidentiality is fundamental
within this semantic classification.4 Speakers express direct evidentiality when
they have direct access to the information source of a proposition, i.e. via sen-
sory, visual or non-visual, perception of certain information or via direct par-
ticipation in a certain action or situation (participatory). Endophoricmarkers
are used in some languages when speakers offer information about their own
psychic or physiological status (direct access to the information by means of
their own internal feeling). Revelative evidentiality concludes the list of direct
evidential values (not mentioned by Plungian 2010). It designates informa-
tion taken from dreams or other forms of visions (cf. Kratschmer-Heijnen 2010:
333).
3 The use of bold face indicates that the value is attested in the sample (for the sample, cf.
sub 3.). Most of these values are discussed in the present paper (but only as far as they are
relevant to the case studies). Means to express common knowledge were not encountered in
the sample, but this value clearly exists in Ancient Greek (cf. the use of the gnomic aorist,
which is an extension of a tense/aspect paradigm; cf. sub 2.3.).
4 The following two paragraphs largely draw on Plungian (2010: 28–34).
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Whereas direct evidentiality is always personal, indirect evidential values
fall into two main categories: personal and non-personal. Inferential eviden-
tiality is indirect and personal; in order to state something about a certain
situation that they did not perceive directly, speakers rely on observable data
to which they have personal access. The same goes for presumptive evidential-
ity; speakers employ their expectations and “logical reasoning” (= personal) to
describe situations that are not directly perceived.Reportative evidentiality is,
on the other hand, indirect and non-personal; an external center of conscious-
ness constitutes the information source of the proposition (i.e. a report from
someone else, also termed hearsay). Quotative evidentiality is a sub-form of
the previous value; it signals that a quotation is being cited verbatim (formally,
most often a morpheme or a particle).5 A last, rather exceptional evidential
value is common knowledge, which can be placed in both the direct and the
indirect/non-personal categories.6
2.3 Classifying Evidential Morphemes: The Formal Perspective
Initially, only verbal morphology and morphemes with evidentiality as their
principal function or semantics were taken into account in general linguistics.
Such an approach largely excluded other means to express evidentiality from
a thorough linguistic study (cf. Aikhenvald 2003; 2004). Recently, however, less
grammaticalized (and even lexical) evidential constructions have increasingly
become part of the research program of linguists (cf. Cornillie 2007 for evi-
dential values of Spanish modal auxiliaries; see also Diewald-Smirnova 2010 &
Hennemann 2013). These constructions are generally referred to as “evidential
strategies”, for their evidential value mainly comes about through contextual–
collocational “side effects” (cf. Aikhenvald 2004: 105–152 for a discussion of evi-
dential strategies). This is motivated by the fact that not every language relies
on verbal morphology to express evidential values; in addition, the distinction
between grammatical and lexicalmeans is not to be regarded as a dual polarity,
but rather as a gradual continuum ranging from “highly grammaticalized” over
“less grammaticalized” to “lexical” (cf. Wiemer 2010: 63). Moreover, certain lin-
guistic elements may evolve frommore lexical to more grammatical over time
(grammaticalization; very rarely in the reverse direction). Wiemer’s (2010: 63)
5 For these last two evidential values, I follow Aikhenvald’s (2004: 25 & 394) terminology.
6 In the first case, common knowledge is perceived as something inwhich the speaker partakes
(he has direct access to it). In the second case, it is considered to be an authoritative body of
knowledge to which the speaker only has indirect and non-personal access.
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figure 1 Linguistic encoding of evidentiality according to Wiemer’s (2010: 63)
lexico-grammatical continuum. Only the horizontal direction is meaningful; the
vertical dimension is arbitrary in this case.
lexico-grammatical continuum is employed as the basis in formally analyzing
Ancient Greek evidential constructions (cf. Figure 1).
2.4 Evidentiality and Extinct Languages
Researchers who specialize in the study of extinct languages, such as Ancient
Greek, and who rely on corpus-based methods when studying linguistic phe-
nomena are compelled to rely chiefly on literary texts (cf. Van Hal 2010). More-
over, the corpus of elaborate low-register texts is substantially smaller than that
of literary texts. Therefore, researchers need to be aware of the fact that differ-
ences may exist between written and spoken language. Chafe (1986), for exam-
ple, points out that English evidential constructions occur more frequently in
written academic texts than in colloquial speech. This is probably related to
the fact that colloquial speech leaves much more unsaid than does academic
language. For example, some pieces of information may be conveyed by facial
expressions or gestures. Nonetheless, in the case of Attic, such a comparison of
spoken and written language is impossible. Thus, I have opted to analyze two
texts that exhibit both oral and written features (cf. sub 3.).
Until a few years ago, the notion of evidentiality and its linguistic encoding
had not been directly addressed in the study of the so-called classical lan-
guages. In fact, Mišeska Tomić (2008: 212) even went so far as to explicitly
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deny that evidentiality could be encoded linguistically in Latin and Ancient
Greek. Consequently, several linguists mentioned in this paper do not use the
concept “evidentiality” in their study of certain relevant aspects of Ancient
Greek (e.g., Basset 1984; 1986). Hence, investigating evidentiality in classical
languages is a recent development. Nevertheless, so far it has remained a small-
scale, punctual endeavor. For example,MéndezDosuna (1999) and Faure (2010;
2014) investigate, among other options, the possibility of an evidential value for
the oblique optative in Ancient Greek (cf. sub 4.6.). In addition, the “logical–
inferential” value of the periphrastic construction with méllō as well as the
Greek future tense has already received some attention from E. Bakker (1997:
17–23) and S. Bakker (2002), respectively. Cuzzolin (2010) offers some prelimi-
nary remarks on evidentiality in Latin. Revelative constructions in Greek and
Latin arebriefly toucheduponbyKratschmer-Heijnen (2010).Moreover, Joseph
(2003) not only takes into account extinct Indo-European languages, but also
explores the possibility of evidential marking in Proto-Indo-European itself.
The results of such earlier studies are discussed in relevant sections of this
paper (sub 4.). Whereas most of the abovementioned scholars concentrate on
one specific construction, the present contribution aims at offering a more
integrative approach.
3 Methodology
This research takes a case study approach to investigating the existence of
evidentialmarkers and strategies inPlato’s ApologiaSocratis (“Apologyof Socra-
tes”; as) and Crito (Cr), which are both Attic writings from the beginning of the
fourth century bc. These constitute an adequate and complementary starting
point. The as is an argumentative text, containing Socrates’ orations at his
399bcprocess, as they arepresentedbyPlato.However, it also contains dialogic
passages (cf. the anecdote about Callias and his sons and the dialogue between
Socrates and Meletus). Because it comprises both argumentative and dialogic
elements, it is taken as themain text. In order to includemore dialogic passages
in the sample, I also consider a short Platonic dialogue (Cr) that encompasses
additional evidential features not present in as. It stages Socrates andhis friend
Crito, who informs him that the day of his execution is near and offers him
a last-minute escape from Athens. Socrates refuses, as he does not want to
commit any injustices. The corpus thus consists of two early works of Plato.
Occasionally and when relevant, references are made to later works by Plato
and to other, mostly Attic, writers. Consequently, the conclusions drawn in this
paper concern, in the first place, the Attic speech variety of that time (and
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Plato’s idiom in particular). Their applicability to other varieties of the Greek
language (ancient, medieval, and/or modern) remains to be determined by
further research.7
The case studies of evidential markers and strategies have been drawn from
the whole spectrum of Wiemer’s (2010: 63) continuum (cf. Figure 1 above),
from particles (situated at the left, lexical end) to the extension of a modal-
ity paradigm (oblique optative; situated at the right, grammatical end). This
approach allows for an adequate exemplification of the variety ofmeans Plato’s
Attic can rely on to indicate the information source of a proposition. Each sec-
tion generally consists of the following three components:
1) A succinct overview and, if applicable, a discussion of relevant secondary
literature (dividable in two groups: studies explicitly referring to the no-
tion of evidentiality and studies which indirectly touch on it; cf. sub 2.4.).
2) An interpretation of the formal features discussed, as they are found in
our sample and starting from the following central research questions:
a. Does the formal feature have evidential meanings or side effects (evi-
dential strategies)?
b. Which evidential value is expressed or generated by the formal feature
in question?
c. Is the evidential value part of the semantic core of the feature (=
evidential marker), or is it generated epiphenomenally (= evidential
strategy)? Where possible, the conditions under which this side effect
occurs are taken into consideration.
d. To which extent do the evidential values of these formal features inter-
fere with other conceptual domains (e.g., modality, mirativity)? This
research question is addressed only peripherally.
3) Where possible, I formulate generalizations on the evidential status of the
linguistic means in question.
7 Evidentials inModern Greek have already received some attention. See, e.g., Friedman (1999)
for evidentiality in the Balkan Sprachbund. In addition, see Ifantidou (2005) and Markou
(2011) for the reportative value of the particles ðiθen and taxa, “supposedly”. The former
also seems to have had evidential meanings in Ancient Greek (dêthen). However, it only
appears once in a later work by Plato (cf. Politicus, 297c), where a presumptive value seems
to be combined with emphatic irony (cf. Denniston 1954: 264–266; esp. 266). Due to its
infrequency, it is not discussed here. See also the work of Katerina Stathi (e.g., 2010; with
Paola Pietrandrea [= Pietrandrea-Stathi 2010]) and especially her (unpublished) conference
contribution during the 30th Annual Convention of the German Society of Linguistics (DGfS;
Bamberg, February 27–29, 2008): “The Rise of Evidential Markers in Modern Greek”.
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Approximate quantitative data are offered throughout, relying on searches
of the database Perseus under PhiloLogic (http://perseus.uchicago.edu/greek
.html) as well as my own reading of the two texts in question.
4 Evidential Markers and Strategies in Ancient Greek
4.1 Particles
Greek is well-known for its abundance of particles, which have received exten-
sive attention. In fact, one of them has already been explicitly connected to
evidentiality: ára (Bakker 1997: 17–23). Other particles discussed in this section
are usually interpreted without being linked directly to evidentiality (cf., e.g.,
some of the more intuitive analyses of Denniston 1954). However, based onmy
reading of the corpus texts, at least five particles qualify for an evidential value:
ára, dḗpou, dêta, oukoûn, and pou. A sixth, dḗ, may be added, although its pre-
cise status remains disputed. Table 2 provides an overview.
table 2 Evidential values of Attic particles in the sample
Evidential
value # of occurrences Secondary literature
ára inferential as: 9× & Cr: 9× Cf. Denniston (1954: 37–38) and
Bakker (1997: 17–23).
(2) pántes
all:nom
ára,
prt.infr
hōs
as
éoiken,
seem:perf.3sg
Athēnaîoi
Athenians:nom
kaloùs
noble:acc.pl
kagathoùs
and.good:acc.pl
poioûsi
make:pres.3pl
plḕn
except
emoû,
me:gen
egṑ
I:nom
dè
prt
mónos
alone:nom
diaphtheírō
corrupt:pres.1sg
‘So, as it seems, all Atheniansmake [the youths] excellentmen, except for
me, and I alone corrupt [them].’8
25a
8 For readers’ benefit, I have translated all Greek quotations in the main text. Emphases are
always mine. In the interest of brevity, I only cite one example of each potential evidential
marker or strategy. As a rule, theGreek text is based on the editions included in the Thesaurus
LinguaeGraecae (tlg) digital library (http://www.tlg.uci.edu). I consistently refer to the Latin
titles, as they are included in this database. Unless mentioned otherwise, all quotations are
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Evidential
value # of occurrences Secondary literature
dḗ inferential? as: 59× & Cr: 32× Cf. Denniston (1954: 238).
(3) apologētéon
defend:ger
dḗ,
prt.infr?
ô
prt
ándres
men:voc
Athēnaîoi
Athenians:voc
‘[…], so there has to be a defense, citizens of Athens, […].’
18e
dḗpou presumptive as: 8× & Cr: 1× Cf. Denniston (1954: 267).
(4) sunegignṓskete
forgive:impf.2pl
dḗpou
prt.presu
án
prt
moi
me:dat
ei
if
en
in
ekeínēi
that:dat
têi
art
phōnêi
voice:dat
te
prt
kaì
and
tôi
art
trópōi
way:dat
élegon
speak:impf.1sg
‘[…], you would presumably forgive me, if I spoke in that tongue and in
that way […].’
17d–18a
dêta inferential as: 2× & Cr: 1× Cf. Denniston (1954: 269 et sqq.).
(5) tí
what
dêta,
prt.infr
ô
prt
Mélēte?
Meletus:voc
‘Butwhat’s that, Meletus?’
25d
oukoûn inferential as: 3× & Cr: 4× Cf. Denniston (1954: 434).
(6) oukoûn
prt.infr
daimónia
divinities:acc
mèn
prt
phḗis
say:pres.2sg
me
me:acc
kaì
and
nomízdein
believe:inf.pres
kaì
and
didáskein
teach:inf.pres
‘So you say that I both believe and teach in supernatural beings, […].’
27c
from as. To avoid being overly extensive, I have only glossed and translated the examples
cited in the main text and in the figures.
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Evidential
value # of occurrences Secondary literature
pou presumptive only in Cr: 5× Cf. Denniston (1954: 490–495).
(7) têi
art
gár
for
pou
prt.presu
husteraíai
later:dat
deî
there.is.need:pres.3sg
me
me:acc
apothnḗiskein
die:inf.pres
ḕ
than
hêi
which:dat
àn
prt
élthēi
go:subj.aor.3sg
tò
art
ploîon
ship:nom
‘For, I assume, I have to die on the day after the ship will come.’
Cr 44a
Theparticle ára is inferential; it signals that Socrates’ utterance is based ondata
he personally perceived (in (2), it is based on Meletus’ argumentation).9 The
inferential value seems to be intensified by the use of the parenthetical phrase
“hōs éoiken”.10 This mitigating (“hedging”) and evidential collocation occurs
approximately 50 times in the entire Platonic corpus and a few times in the
works of other Attic writers (Aristophanes, Euripides, Sophocles, Xenophon;
once in each), which seems to point to an idiosyncrasy of Attic (or even of
Plato). Specifically, it suggests a lower degree of epistemic certainty on the
speaker’s part about the contents of the proposition.11 In addition, the particle
may have a mirative extension (cf. sub 2.1. for mirativity), as possibly in (2);
Socrates is (ironically) surprised to hear that he alone is corrupting youngsters
and that all others aremaking thembetter. This seems to indicate that ára is an
evidentialmarkerwith inferential evidentiality as its semantic core, interfering
with a hedging function (indicating lesser epistemic certainty) and possibly
having a mirative extension.
9 For an example from Sophocles, cf.Oedipus Coloneus 1744–1746: “[Antigone]mógos ékhei.
[Choir] kaì páros epeîkhe. / [Antigone] totè mèn ápora, totè d’húperthen. / [Choir]
még’ára pélagos elákhetón ti.” On the basis of Antigone’s bad circumstances, the choir
infers that she suffers from “a vast troubling sea”.
10 In Plato, Meno 78b, the source of inference is made explicit by the addition of a prepo-
sitional phrase (katá + accusative): “toût’éstin ára, hōs éoike, katà tòn sòn lógon aretḗ,
dúnamis toû porízdesthai tagathá.”
11 The collocation is combined twice with impersonal deî, adding the factor of epistemic
necessity to the inference (Meno 78d and Hipparchus 231d) while also mitigating it.
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The value of dḗ is problematic. Although it may generate an inferential
evidential value, it certainly has a discursive–deictic function. It recapitulates
what precedes the clause inwhich it appears (Denniston 1954: 239), or indicates
that the evidence for the proposition is shared by the speaker and hearer (it
is “obvious”).12 As in (3), the evidence for the necessity of Socrates’ action to
defend is accessible to both the speaker and hearer, for it is based on previous
elements in his process and his speech. Here, there is a thin line between
inference and recapitulation of information known to the speaker and hearer.
Not only is the need for a defense obvious to both; it also constitutes a piece of
information that is inferred on the basis of the external circumstances. In this
case, however, inference appears to be a contextual side effect of the deictic
function of the particle (= possible evidential strategy).13
A third particle, dḗpou, clearly points to presumptive evidentiality. In (4),
Socrates is proposing a hypothesis in the irrealis. He presumes that if he were a
stranger, his hearers would forgive him. There is no direct evidence to support
his proposition; he is basing this notion on his own expectations. This passage
(along with the other 8) clearly establishes dḗpou as an evidential marker. For-
mally, it consists of the particle dḗ and the relativizing enclitic pou, which mit-
igates the obviousness of the information expressed by dḗ and can also have a
presumptivemeaning itself (cf. infra). A fourth particle also has the element dḗ
in it: dêta. It expresses an unexpected inference (and even indignation), which
points to a mirative use (cf. Denniston 1954: 272). This use, however, seems to
be mainly (but not exclusively) limited to interrogative contexts, referring to
an inference that will be made in what follows (Denniston 1954: 269 et sqq.). In
declarative sentences, it signals a strong confirmation of the information pro-
vided in the proposition.14 Therefore, the mainly deictic particle dḗ not only
may have an inferential value epiphenomenally, but also constitutes the for-
mal basis for two othermarkers, with evidentiality as (a part of) their semantic
core.
12 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out the importance of deixis and
information status for the value of this particle. The interaction between deixis, informa-
tion status, and evidentiality is in need of further investigation.
13 Inference is not always present, cf. 27c: “ei dè daimónia nomízdō, kaì daímonas dḗpou
pollḕ anágkē nomízdein mé estin: oukh hoútōs ékhei? ékhei dḗ: títhēmi gár se homolo-
goûnta, epeidḕ ouk apokrínēi.” Here, dḗmerely recapitulates information that is suggested
in the preceding question and evident to both speaker and hearers.
14 Cf. Cr 49b, where Crito is confirming Socrates’ inference “oudamôs ára deî adikeîn” with
the reply “ou dêta”.
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Apart from indicating recapitulation, the interrogative particle oukoûn (<
negation ouk+ oûn) also denotes an inferencewithin an interrogative context.15
In (6), Socrates is inferringMeletus’ statement on the basis of the latter’s words.
Often in such cases, the speaker considers the contents of his question to be
true (cf. Denniston 1954: 434, who considers this use “strictly inferential”).
The original meaning of the enclitic pou is clearly local (“somewhere”).
Among other things, a presumptive meaning developed out of this, which was
already present in Homer.16 In (7), Socrates is relying on his own reasoning
and expectations to assert that he has to die the day after the ship arrives.
This enclitic particle probably conveys a lower degree of epistemic certainty
than does the cognate particle dḗpou, as it lacks the parameter of “obviousness”
conveyed by dḗ. This indicates that the evidential values of pou and dḗpou are
interconnected, but with different degrees of epistemic certainty, pointing to
interferenceofmodalitywith evidentiality (cf. sub 2.1.). Thepresumptivemean-
ing of both particles appears to block their collocation with the confirmative
particle oûn (cf. Denniston 1954: 493).
Thus, the abovementioned findings seem not only to establish some par-
ticles (ára, dḗpou, oukoûn, pou) as evidential markers but also to confirm the
linkwithmirativity as characteristic of inferential evidentialmorphemes cross-
linguistically (in the case of ára and dêta). The Attic data are well suited to the
general typology of evidentiality.17 The evidential value of dḗ seems to be a side
effect of its main discursive–deictic function (evidential strategy). Two parti-
cles (dêta and oukoûn) are only used evidentially in interrogative contexts.18
The ways in which the several inferential particles differ remain to be deter-
mined. Nonetheless, the status of the proposition is clearly of importance in
this regard (statement vs. question).19
15 The particle oûn is not taken to be evidential on the basis of the instances in the sample;
it functions mainly as a connective or as a confirmatory particle (cf. also Denniston 1954:
415 et sqq.).
16 Cf. Ilias 3.308–309: “Zdeùs mén pou tó ge oîde kaì athánatoi theoì álloi / hoppotérōi
thanátoio télos peprōménon estín.”
17 Cf., e.g., the inferential suffix -l’el in Kolyma Yukaghir, a linguistic isolate (or possibly a
Uralic language) from East Siberia, which also displays a mirative extension (Maslova
2003: 173).
18 According to Rijksbaron (1976: 77 et sqq.), the conjunction epeí, in some of its uses, can
also be regarded as an inferential particle. However, it remains to be determined whether
this assertion holds and to what extent this connotation can be viewed as functionally
evidential rather than semantically causal.
19 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this question.
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Summary: Five particles (ára, dḗpou, dêta, oukoûn, pou) are interpreted as
evidential markers, and dḗ may have evidential extensions (= evidential
strategy). These particles exclusively express indirect personal evidential
values (inferential & presumptive). The conceptual domain of mirativity
is probably of importance for ára and dêta.
4.2 Complementizer Strategies: Participial Clauses
A number of well-known constructions may denote several evidential values
that are intertwined not only with the semantics of the main predicate, but
also with the way it is complemented syntactically. Twomain semantic groups
to be dealt with here are verbs of perception and declarative verbs. The former
are treated in this section, and the possible complementizing patterns of the
latter category are presented in Section 4.3.
In 22c, Socrates repudiates the poets because of their boasting and their
fallacious claims of wisdom. Because this is a fact he himself experiences
in the streets of Athens, he uses a first person verbal form and a genitive
and participle construction (genitivus cum participio; abbreviated as GcP) to
express his personal observation of their arrogance:
(8) kaì
and
háma
at.once
ēisthómēn
observe:aor.mid.1sg
autôn
these:gen
dià
through
tḕn
art
poíēsin
poetry:acc
oioménōn
believe:ptcp.pres.gen.pl
kaì
and
tâlla
the.other:acc.pl
sophōtátōn
wise:superl.gen.pl
eînai
be:inf.pres
anthrṓpōn
men:gen
hà
which:acc.pl
ouk
neg
êsan
be:impf.3pl
‘And at the same time I observed that those men—because of their
poetry—thought that they were also in other respects utmost wise men,
in which they were not.’
22c
Earlier, Socrates had criticized the sophists for offering education in exchange
for a large amount ofmoney.Within this context, he refers to Evenus, a second-
rate sophist fromParus, whowas recruitingAthenian youths in 399bc. Because
his fellow citizens informed Socrates about Evenus’ sojourn in the city (he him-
self had not seen him), he resorts to a slightly different linguistic construction:
(9) epeì
for
kaì
also
állos
other:nom.sg
anḗr
man:nom
esti
be:pres.3sg
Pários
Parian:nom.sg
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entháde
here
sophòs
wise:nom.sg
hòn
whom:acc.sg
egṑ
I:nom
ēisthómēn
observe:aor.mid.1sg
epidēmoûnta
be.in.city:ptcp.pres.acc.sg
‘For there is also another wiseman fromParus,who—so I heard—was in
the city.’
20a
Exactly the same verb as in (8) is used to relate a different mode of know-
ing. Whereas Socrates himself had witnessed the information expressed by
the GcP in (8), his evidence for Evenus’ stay in Athens (9) is indirect and
based on hearsay, which is rendered by the use of an accusative and partici-
ple (accusativus cum participio; abbreviated as AcP). These constructions are
well-known to grammarians of Ancient Greek, who describe them adequately,
but fail to identify them as evidential strategies conveying different evidential
values.
The clearest example of a verb of perception with different complemen-
tizing patterns in the sample is aisthánomai: “to observe personally (+ GcP);
to obtain information indirectly through hearsay (+ AcP)”. Depending on the
case of the noun and predicative participle following the main verb, the con-
struction expresses a direct, sensory (i.e. visual) evidential value (genitive; cf.
example (8)) or hearsay (accusative; cf. example (9)), provided that the main
verb itself is constructed in the first person.20 An example from Cr shows that
the direct, perceptual mode of knowing can also be expressed by an indirect
question after aisthánomai.21 A verb with a similar semantico-syntactic pat-
tern is akoúō: “to hear directly (+ GcP); to hear via an intermediary (+ AcP)”.
Therefore, the genitive is used for direct, sensory modes of knowing, whereas
the accusative is reserved for indirect, hearsay modes of knowing with verbs of
perception. Other constructions with akoúō can also convey evidential mean-
ings.22
20 If not, the construction does not refer to the information source for the proposition, but
rather reports an observation (genitive) or an acquisition of indirect information by the
subject of the main predicate (accusative).
21 Cf. Cr 43b: “allà kaì soû pálai thaumázdō aisthanómenos hōs hēdéōs katheúdeis.” For a
perception verb with completive hōs, cf. sub 4.3.2. and—more specifically—example (12).
22 Cf., e.g., akoúō + accusative of the object + genitive of source (hearsay) in Homer, Odyssea
12.389: “taûta d’egṑn ḗkousa Kalupsoûs ēükómoio.”
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A similar case might be detected in the different constructions after verbs
with sensory meanings other than audition. However, no examples of this
constructionwere found in the sample. A quick search through the tlg reveals
that there indeed exists a participial construction for visual evidence, i.e. the
verb horáō, “to see”, followed by an AcP, constituted by an accusative noun
and a predicative present participle. See, e.g., the following sentence from
Aristophanes’Ecclesiazusae 27–28:
(10) all’
well
horô
see:pres.1sg
tondì
this.here:acc
lúkhnon
light:acc
prosiónta
approach:ptcp.pres.acc.sg
‘[…] well, I see this light approaching.’
In contrast, the same verb with an aorist participle appears to be an evidential
strategy, because it expresses an inferential value epiphenomenally (being a
side effect caused by the semantics of themain verb and the aorist (perfective)
aspect of the participle; cf., e.g., Euripides’Hecuba 733–734: “tín’ándra tónd’epì
skēnaîs horô / thanónta Trṓōn?”, where Agamemnon infers on the basis of
the dead body that the man in question has died there, near the tents). The
abovementioned participial phrases clearly have evidential side effects; they
are evidential strategies.
Summary: Different complementizers with verbs of perception appear
to have evidential side effects (evidential strategies). A genitive and par-
ticiple construction points to direct observation, whereas the accusative
counterpart epiphenomenally expresses hearsay.
4.3 Complementizer Strategies: The Functional Opposition between
hóti/háte and hōs
The opposition hóti–hōs on the one hand and háte–hōs on the other comprises
three different functional oppositions:
i. the contrast between completive hóti and hōs;
ii. the contrast between non-completive hóti and hōs, and
iii. the contrast betweenháte andhōs as conjunctions introducingparticipial
clauses.
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4.3.1 Completive hóti and hōs
In the past decades, the exact value of completive hóti and hōs has received
much attention. Table 3 provides a schematic overview of the most important
hypotheses that have been designed to account for this opposition and which
are often based on the study of only one author or on some arbitrarily selected
examples. Thepresent section aims to investigate (i) the value of the opposition
between these two Attic complementizers, which is inextricably intertwined
with the semantics of the main predicate, and (ii) whether this much-studied
contrast has an evidential semantics.
table 3 Overview of the most important hypotheses concerning completive hóti and hōs
hóti vs. hōs: The speaker’s
Nature of the attitude toward the
Scholar difference complement Research based on
Humbert (1960) semantico-
pragmatic
(optional)
hóti: “neutral”
hōs: no speaker’s commitment
(sc)
selected examples
Monteil (1963) semantico-
functional
(optional)
hóti: actual fact
hōs: dubious or probable
information
diachronically
selected examples
De Boel (1980) semantico-
functional
hóti: actual fact or no
judgment about factuality
hōs: no judgment about
factuality
mainly
Aristophanes
Neuberger-
Donath
(1982)
semantico-
functional
hóti: “speaker-external
information”
hōs: “speaker-internal
information”
in Attic: no sc after verba
dicendi
Herodotus
Adrados (1992) none
Cristofaro
(2008)
pragmatic hóti: “focus”
hōs: “topic” or no sc
selected examples
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In general, linguists seem to agree thathótidenotes an actual fact in aneutral
way, whereas hōs is connected—however vaguely—with subjectivity. It is clear
that there is a certain functional contrast between the two complementizers,
the precise nature of which still remains rather opaque and probably differs
diachronically and dialectally. In what follows, the two most recent hypothe-
ses acknowledging the contrast between hóti and hōs will take center stage,
i.e., that of Neuberger-Donath (1982) and that of Cristofaro (2008). According
to Neuberger-Donath (1982), hōs signals that the subject of the main verb itself
constitutes the source of information for the contents of the completive phrase
(= “subjective” value); hóti, on the other hand, presents information taken over
from others and/or based on external facts. The author bases her hypothesis
principally on a study of Herodotus, but also offers a brief verification of her
hypothesis by means of examples from Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripi-
des, Thucydides, and Plato. Ultimately, she concludes that Attic has undergone
a semantic shift; after verbs of speaking, hōs points to a lack of the speaker’s
commitment (abbreviated as sc).
Cristofaro (2008: 589), on the other hand, argues that the distinction
between the two complementizers is largely pragmatic; hóti-clauses express
information “with a high communicative value” ( focus or rhema), whereas the
communicative value of hōs-clauses is said to be low. Therefore, hōs-clauses
have two distinct, but related, meanings: (i) for expressing information already
known (topic or theme) and (ii) for indicating that the speaker does not want
to take the responsibility for the contents of the completive clause. Thus, hōs-
clauses do not contribute to “the further development of the communicative
process” (Cristofaro 2008: 588). If hóti and hōs are interchangeable without a
difference in meaning, this is said to be due to the pragmatically intermedi-
ary status of the situations described. In what follows, the two hypotheses are
tested against the evidence of the sample and discussed within the framework
of evidentiality.
4.3.2 Analysis and Discussion
In the sample, completive hóti is used with
i. verbs (and nouns) of knowing and considering (21×) [e.g., logízdomai],
ii. verbs (and nouns) of showing (19×) [e.g., deíknumi],
iii. verbs of speaking (8×) [e.g., apokrínomai], and
iv. verbs of perception (5×) [e.g., aisthánomai].
The data of the sample reveal that the information conveyed by completive
hóti-clauses receives the speaker’s commitment (as in (13)). It is also the typical
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complementizer following verbs of knowing and considering (cf., e.g., 21d and
29b), which are never completed by hōs-clauses in the sample. This seems to
be a general tendency. A preliminary search in the texts included in the Perseus
under PhiloLogic database reveals only 162 examples of the lemma oîda + hōs,
in which cases hōsmostly functions as an indirect interrogative adverb rather
than as a complementizer. In comparison, there are 1272 instances of oîda +
hóti.23
There are clear instances in which hóti contrasts with completive hōs. In
certain cases, hōs indicates that there is no sc, occasionally provoking an
epistemic extensionof uncertainty. This connotation only seems to occurwhen
themain predicate is a verb of saying or a verb of perception. See the analysis of
Neuberger-Donath (1982) discussed above and (11), where Socrates clearly does
not agree with the information expressed by the hōs-clause:
(11) kaì
and
légousin
say:pres.3pl
hōs
that
Sōkrátēs
Socrates:nom
tís
a:nom
esti
is:pres.3sg
miarṓtatos
defiled:superl.nom.sg
kaì
and
diaphtheírei
corrupt:pres.3sg
toùs
art
néous
youths:acc
‘[…] and they say that Socrates is an utterly defiled person, and corrupts
the youths.’
23d
Apart fromreportative evidentiality (< verbof speaking+hōs), thephrase in (11)
implies a lack of sc; Socrates clearly does not agreewith this bad opinion about
himself. Furthermore, oftentimes completive hōs offers informationwith a low
communicative value [= topic] (Cristofaro’s 2008 hypothesis). It is used with
i. verbs (and nouns) of speaking (11×) [e.g., légō],
ii. verbs of judging (3×) [e.g., katēgoréō],
iii. one verb of showing [epideíknumi],
iv. one verb of believing [peíthomai], and
v. one verb of perception [akoúō].
The data found in the sample neatly fit in with Neuberger-Donath’s (1982)
hypothesis. When hōs follows verbs of speaking, showing, judging, and want-
ing, it marks that the subject of the main predicate constitutes the source of
23 The Perseus under PhiloLogic database contains the most important literary texts from
Homer up to the Hellenistic and Roman eras.
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information for the contents of the subordinate completive clause (cf. Table 4
below). Following a perception verb, the complementizer stresses that the sub-
ject of the predicate governing the hōs-clause has learned the information in
the completive clause directly from someone else (thus, not via an intermedi-
ary):24
(12) oudé
neg.emp
g’
prt
eí
if
tinos
someone:gen
akēkóate
hear:perf.2pl
hōs
that
egṑ
I:nom
paideúein
educate:inf.pres
epikheirô
try:pres.1sg
anthrṓpous
men:acc
kaì
and
khrḗmata
money:acc
práttomai,
exact:pres.mid.1sg
oudè
neg.emp
toûto
that:nom
alēthés
true:nom
‘[…], and if you have heard from someone that I’m trying to educate
people and ask money for it, that is not at all true.’
19d–e
In this case, the perception verb + hōs construction not only indicates that the
information expressed in the hōs-clause is directly heard by the subject of the
verb of perception fromanother center of consciousness. It also seems to signal
a lack of sc, as the words “oudè toûto alēthés” make explicit (Socrates does not
agree that he is trying to educate people, while asking money for it).
With regard to the instances in the sample, it remains unclear which of the
two hypotheses is correct. Nevertheless, a tentative answer may be possible;
see, e.g., (11) and (13–15):
(13) apekrinámēn
answer:aor.mid.1sg
oûn
prt
emautôi
myself:dat
kaì
and
tôi
art
khrēsmôi
oracle:dat
hóti
that
moi
me:dat
lusiteloî
profit:opt.pres.3sg
hṓsper
as
ékhō
have:pres.1sg
ékhein
have:inf.pres
‘So I answered myself and the oracle that it is advantageous for me to be
as I am.’
22e
24 When a speaker expresses his source of information based on sensory (visual, auditory,
etc.) observation and, in some cases, on hearsay (e.g., with aisthánomai + AcP; see (9)),
it is logically necessary that the first person is closely connected to the main verb of the
sentence in order to demonstrate a truly evidential value (most often as the subject of the
main verb or as a dative pronoun with impersonal verbs). This is, however, not the case
with akēkóate in (12).
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(14) hikanôs
sufficiently
epideíknusai
show:pres.mid.2sg
hóti
that
oudepṓpote
never
ephróntisas
concern:aor.2sg
tôn
art
néōn
youths:gen
‘[…] you sufficiently show that you have never concerned yourself about
the youths, […].’
25c
(15) hōs
that
dè
prt
toûto
this:nom
hoútōs
so
ékhei,
have:pres.3sg
peirásomai
try:fut.mid.1sg
kaì
also
humîn
you:dat.pl
epideîksai
show:inf.aor
‘And that this is so, I will try to demonstrate also to you.’
24c
When one contrasts (13) with (11), hōs seems to be used (i) to offer information
that is already known and does not help forward the action (in accordance
with Cristofaro 2008) and (ii) to mark the subject of the predicate governing
the hōs-clause as the source of information for the contents of the completive
clause (in accordance with Neuberger-Donath 1982). As discussed above, hōs
also implicates a lack of sc (Neuberger-Donath 1982 and Cristofaro 2008),
resulting in an epistemic extensionof uncertainty anda connotationof indirect
reportative evidentiality. These two nuances are limited to verbs of speaking,
whereas the lack of sc also appears after perception verbs + completive hōs (as
is clear from our analysis of (12)).25
When hōs follows a verb of showing, it indicates that the subject of the verb
governing the completive clause constitutes the information source for the
contents of the hōs-clause; see (15) and Neuberger-Donath (1982). In addition,
the information in the hōs-clause has a topic value (Cristofaro 2008). On the
other hand, when hóti follows a verb of showing, it indicates that the infor-
mation has not sprung from the subject of the main verb, but is founded on
external factors (in (14) the actions of Meletus; Neuberger-Donath 1982). How-
ever, the information introduced by hóti in (14) does not seem to have a high
communicative value (paceCristofaro 2008), as the hóti-phrase discusses infor-
mation already mentioned by Socrates. This may suggest that the focus value
of hóti-clauses is a frequent pragmatic effect of this complementizer.
25 This lack of sc is an innovation of Ionic–Attic rather than of Attic alone (paceNeuberger-
Donath 1982; see note 26).
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The instance in 26c, however, may confirm both viewpoints:
(16) taûta
these.things:acc
légō,
say:pres.1sg
hōs
that
tò
art
parápan
altogether
ou
neg
nomízdeis
believe:pres.2sg
theoús
gods:acc
‘That I say, that you do not believe in the gods at all.’
26c
This passage allows for two different interpretations:
i. Following Neuberger-Donath (1982): hōs indicates that the subject of the
main predicate is the source for the information offered in the completive
clause. The connotation of a lack of sc is, however, blocked by the first
person subject. Neuberger-Donath’s (as well as Cristofaro’s) hypothesis
needs to be corrected in this regard; lack of sc only arises in non-first-
person contexts.
ii. Following Cristofaro (2008): hōs marks the introduction of information
with topic value that is already known from the accuser’s speech (in
addition, the presence and deictic function of “taûta” signals that the hōs-
clause conveys known information).
4.3.3 Conclusion
The few instances present in the sample cannot yield a definitive answer as to
which of these hypotheses is the correct one or whether they are tenable at all.
However, Neuberger-Donath (1982) seems to have penetratedmore deeply into
the functional value of the hóti–hōs distinction. Cristofaro’s (2008) explanation
only holds true for a pragmatic effect. A tentative description of the interaction
between the complementizers on the one hand and the several semantic types
of verbs on the other is offered in Table 4 below.
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table 4 Semantic types of predicates in combination with hóti/hōs (inspired by
Neuberger-Donath 1982)
Verbs of hóti Example hōs Example
considering information based
on the experience
of external data or
acquired from others
29b information obtained
by one’s own reflection
(not in later Ionic and
Attic)
–
showing proof of information
based on external
factors
32d
(14)
proof of information
based on “properties
of the subject”
(Neuberger-Donath
1982: 263)
24c
(15)
speaking non-first-person
forms: information
obtained by hearsay
23a
(13)
information
originating from
the subject of the
verb governing the
hōs-clause
23d
(11)
perception information received
as a message by means
of an intermediary (cf.
Neuberger-Donath
1982: 254)
38c information
personally observed
by the subject of the
verb governing the
hōs-clause
19d–e
(12)
These values seem to be encountered in Ionic–Attic from Herodotus onwards.
In later Ionic (Hippocrates [ca. 460bc–ca. 370bc]) and Attic, a new connota-
tion arises after verbs of speaking + hōs, i.e. a lack of sc, which accompanies
the reportative evidential value with non-first-person main verbs.26 In Attic,
26 Relying on epigraphic material, Monteil (1963: 355) contends that hōs reached the status
of fully fledged complementizer only in fifth-century bc Attic. The fact that these inscrip-
tions, which are composed in a conservative administrative language, show only a few
instances of completive hōs, leads him to argue that this function is a recent linguistic
development in Attic (Monteil 1963: 355). Hippocrates’ language, however, seems to sug-
gest that this development is not limited to fifth-century bc Attic; cf. De prisca medicina
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hóti becomes the typical complementizer after verbs of knowing and consid-
ering (thus initiating a setback of hōs as a complementizer in later times; see
Jannaris 1968: 412). Broadly speaking, the hóti–hōs opposition shares common
ground with evidentiality in that the complementizers are able to signal the
nature of the relationship between the information expressed by the comple-
tive clause and the subject of themain verb. In particular, when verbs of saying
are combinedwith these two complementizers, this construction conveys both
the evidential value of hearsay and different degrees of epistemic commitment
(lack of sc with hōs in non-first-person forms).27 Thus, it seems justified to
state that the distinction between these conjunctions is to be situated on the
interface between epistemic modality, information status (pragmatics), and
evidentiality.
Other approachesmay also be useful in interpreting the opposition between
hóti and hōs, such as that of the “privative opposition” (cf. Clinquart-Isebaert
1984, where it is successfully applied to Ancient Greek linguistic features other
than hóti and hōs). Because hóti is diachronically the first complementizer,
and hōs only gradually obtained a complementizing function, there may have
existed a so-called opposition privativebetween hóti and hōs.Within this frame-
work, hóti would be the unmarked neutral term, solely expressing subordina-
tion, and hōswould be themarked term, which is usedwhen there is a relation-
ship of “interiorization” between the information presented in the completive
clause and the subject of the verb governing it (evoking a reportative eviden-
tial value combinedwith a lack of sc after verbs of speaking in non-first-person
forms). This approach can be employed tomap out certain Ancient Greek syn-
tactic structures, as proven by the analysis of consecutive phrases. These either
contain an infinitive verb form (the older structure & the neutral term), which
expresses both factual and non-factual consequences,28 or a finite verb form
(the more recent structure & the marked term), which only denotes factual
consequences.29
20: “légousi dé tines iētroì kaì sophistaí hōs ouk éni dunatòn iētrikḕn eidénai hóstis mḕ
oîden hó tí estin ánthrōpos.”
27 In first person forms, the subject of the main verb of saying constitutes the source of
information. This blocks a possible connotation of “lack of sc”.
28 The infinitive is thus indifferent to the factuality of the consequence.
29 Consult Clinquart-Isebaert (1984) for further details and other examples of oppositions
privatives in Ancient Greek.
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4.4 hóti and Other QuotativeMarkers
As a side note, I must record one clearly evidential value of hóti, derived from
its completive use. In the sample, there are ten instances where hóti is used as
a quotative marker:
(17) egṑ
I:nom
dè
prt
toútōi
him:dat
àn
prt
díkaion
just:acc.sg
lógon
speech:acc
anteípoimi
answer:opt.aor.1sg
hóti
quot
“Ou
neg
kalôs
well
légeis”
speak:pres.2sg
‘But I would answer him with a just speech: “You don’t speak well, […].” ’
28b
Another quotative marker is the highly defective and grammaticalized verb
ēmí, “to say”,30 which expresses indirect and non-personal quotative eviden-
tiality:
(18) pánu
certainly
ge,
prt
ê
say:impf.3sg
d’
prt
hós
he:nom
‘“Most certainly”, he said.’
20b
and direct (ergo personal) quotative evidentiality:
(19) ô
prt
Kallía,
Callias:voc
ên
say:impf.1sg
d’
prt
egṓ
I:nom
‘“Callias,” I said, “[…].” ’
20a
In (19), the fact that the speaker is citing himself shows that quotative eviden-
tiality doesnot alwayshave tobe indirect andnon-personal; it can alsobedirect
(ergo personal) in past contexts. Quotative evidentiality is part of the semantic
core of this defective and highly reduced verb, which is subject to a number of
syntactic restrictions, including the following:
i. The use of this verb is strictly limited to quotations and it cannot be
accompanied by an accusative and infinitive clause nor by quotative/
30 It has a limited number of forms—the first person present form ēmí and the past tense
collocations ên d’egṓ, ê d’hós, and ê d’hḗ.
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completive hóti, probably marking that the defective verb has absorbed
the quotative function.
ii. If ēmí is used in the past (imperfect) tense, an Attic speaker is obliged to
mark the grammatical person in order to give more substance to the verb
form, which is reduced to one syllable in the first person (ên) or even to
one vowel in the third person (ê). The personal pronoun is always pre-
ceded by the elided adversative particle d’ (< dé). As a rule, the ensemble
[d’ + personal pronoun] follows the verb form.
Summary: hōs marks a specific relation between the subject of the main
verb and the information relayed in the completive clause. The subject of
the main verb is presented as the source for this information and can,
in non-first-person forms, convey a lack of the speaker’s commitment
(mainly after verbs of speaking).hóti, on the contrary, does not signal such
an evidential overtone. As a side note, the quotative values of hóti and ēmí
are briefly discussed.
4.5 háte and hōs& hóti and hōs Introducing Adverbial Clauses
A study of the semantics of the conjunctions háte and hóti on the one hand
and hōs on the other makes clear that this distinction is less ambiguous than
that between completive hóti and hōs. This is also suggested by the limited
amount of secondary literature on this topic.31 Muchnová (1990–1992) dis-
cusses the causal–completive use of hótiwith verbs of feeling. Themost exten-
sive treatment of these conjunctions is found in Rijksbaron (1976). He asserts
that non-completive hōs-clauses do not express a real reason or cause; rather,
they indicate indirect discourse, occasionally giving rise to a causal connota-
tion (depending on the context).32 Causal hóti-clauses, just as completive hóti-
clauses originating from a relative pronoun meaning “the fact that” (Monteil
31 Some grammars do not even discuss a potential semantic contrast between háte and hōs
+ participle (e.g., Humbert 1960).
32 See Rijksbaron (1976: 120–121). hōs + finite verb is said to have developed by analogy with
causal hóti (Monteil 1963: 358–359). The original fundamental meaning of hōswas clearly
an instrumental one (“the way in which, the means by which”; cf. Monteil 1963: 341–
342), from which the reportative as well as the completive use were derived via so-called
bridging contexts (i.e. contexts in which hōs may be ascribed both an instrumental and
a reportative/completive value; cf. Monteil 1963: 354–355). The methodological principle
of bridging contexts is a useful means for analyzing the diachronic evolution of semantic
and syntactic evolutions; cf., e.g., Bloem (2008).
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1963: 248–251), appear to possess four characteristics that are lacking in hōs-
clauses with finite verbs (Rijksbaron 1976: 146). hóti-clauses can be
i. used to answer questions introduced by tí (‘why?’),
ii. coordinated with other “causal adjuncts”, such as prepositional clauses,
iii. accompanied by an anaphoric or a cataphoric prepositional phrase, and
iv. followed by a parenthetical phrase relativizing the contents of the
clause.33
Rijksbaron (1976: 151 & 205, note 45) also accounts for the contrast between
háte and hōs + participle. He argues that the latter construction first marks
that someone else’s words are reported, with the causal connotation being a
contextual side effect. hōs + participle signals that the information is based
on the opinion—or rather the knowledge—of the subject of the main pred-
icate, which may be fallacious (Rijksbaron 1976: 153–154 & 205, note 49). To
conclude, Rijksbaron (1976: 155) mentions a semantic restriction on the use of
hōs + participle that supports his analysis: only main verbs that have a sub-
ject with the semantic role of agent can be accompanied by this participial
phrase.34háte+participle, on the other hand, refers to factual causes recounted
from the point of view of the speaker or narrator.35 Oguse (1962: 204–210) offers
33 Rijksbaron (1976: 147) also sees a pragmatic distinction between hóti and hōs; non-com-
pletive hōs introduces a new phase in the story, whereas causal hóti provides information
that is already known. This is an inversion of the pragmatic distinction Cristofaro (2008)
suggests for completive hóti and hōs (she does not mention Rijksbaron’s study; cf. sub
4.3.1.). It remains to be determined whether these two approaches are reconcilable. Ini-
tially, Rijksbaron’s thesis, which is based on a partial analysis of Herodotus’ Historiae,
does not seem tenable; compare Herodotus 1.34.1: metà dè Sólōna oikhómenon élabe ek
theoû némesismegálē Kroîson, hōs eikásai, hóti enómise heōutòn eînai anthrṓpōn hapántōn
olbiṓtaton (in which the hóti-clause offers new information) with 1.79.2: enthaûta Kroîsos
es aporíēn pollḕn apigménos, hṓs hoi parà dóksan éskhe tà prḗgmata ḕ hōs autòs katedó-
kee, hómōs toùs Ludoùs eksêge es mákhēn (in which the hōs-clause contains information
already known).
34 Rijksbaron (1976: 155 & 206, note 57) refers to the (lack of) grammaticality of the following
English sentences: Supposing that the rain had stopped he rushed out into the garden.
vs. *Supposing that the rain had stopped he fell into the garden. The subject of the last
sentence is an experiencer and not an agent; consequently, the participle construction
supposing that, the English equivalent of hōs + participle, cannot be used within this
context. Therefore, the use of this construction is much more limited than that of háte
+ participle (Rijksbaron 1976: 156).
35 háte + participle owes its causal value to the originally comparative and appositive use
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a similar explanation for the value of háte + participle. However, he adds that
the meaning of háte is different when used with an irrealis or a potentialis. In
this case, háte + participle expresses a premise—or at least a certain form of
supporting information—which is needed in order to follow the hypothetic
reasoning in question. In the next paragraphs, the instances of non-completive
hóti and hōs and the conjunction háte as they appear in the sample are dis-
cussed.
Although hōs + finite verb does not appear in the sample (predominantly
used in older Attic and Ionic; cf. Jannaris 1968: 408), causal hóti is found six
times; it is followed by the indicative in all instances. In each case, the speaker
commits himself to the cause he states:
(20) egṑ
I:nom
dé
prt
ge,
prt
ô
prt
ándres
men:voc
Athēnaîoi,
Athenians:voc
adikeîn
do.injustice:inf.pres
phēmi
say:pres.1sg
Mélēton,
Meletus:acc
hóti
because
spoudêi
zeal:dat
kharientízdetai
jest:pres.mp.3sg
‘But I, Atheniangentlemen, say thatMeletus is doing an injustice,because
he is jesting seriously, […].’
24c
háte+participle occurs three times in the sample (as 23d, 39b (2×)). It indicates
that the speaker takes responsibility for the reason expressed in the particip-
ial clause, which is reinforced by the parenthetical use of oîmai (“methinks”)
after háte in 23d, indicating that the speaker is the source of the informa-
tion:
(21) háte
because
oûn
prt
oîmai
believe:pres.mp.1sg
philótimoi
ambitious:nom.pl
óntes
be:ptcp.pres.nom.pl
kaì
and
sphodroì
impetuous:nom.pl
kaì
and
polloí,
many:nom.pl
kaì
and
suntetaménōs
vigorously
kaì
and
pithanôs
persuasively
légontes
speak:ptcp.pres.nom.pl
perì
about
emoû,
me:gen
empeplḗkasin
fill:perf.3pl
humôn
you:gen.pl
tà
art
ôta
ears:acc
kaì
and
pálai
long.ago
kaì
and
sphodrôs
vehemently
diabállontes
slander:ptcp.pres.nom.pl
of this conjunction; the causal meaning is first attested in Herodotus (Monteil 1963: 244–
245).
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‘Thus, since they, methinks, are ambitious, impetuous, and numerous,
and since they speak vigorously as well as persuasively about me, they
have filled your ears both long ago and whilst accusing vehemently.’
23d–e
The sample contains 12 examples of hōs + participle. It denotes in all instances
that the speaker distances himself from the information offered by the partici-
ple, and that he attributes it to the subject of the main predicate (e.g., 17a–b)
as long as he is not the subject of the main predicate (as in 40a: humîn gàr hōs
phílois oûsin epideîksai ethélō, where hōs is used to stress that the speaker is the
source of the information conveyed in the participial clause):
(22) élegon
say:impf.3pl
hōs
that
khrên
it.is.necessary:impf.3sg
humâs
you:acc.pl
eulabeîsthai
beware:inf.pres.mp
mḕ
that.not
hup’
by
emoû
me:gen
eksapatēthête
deceive:subj.aor.pass.2pl
hōs
claiming.that
deinoû
clever:gen.sg
óntos
be:ptcp.pres.gen.sg
légein
speak:inf.pres
‘[…] they said that it was necessary for you to beware yourself of being
deceived by me, claiming that I am clever at speaking.’
17a–b
In (22), the reportative status of the evidence is confirmedby theuse of a verb of
speaking followedby completivehōs, indicating a lack of sc. Rijksbaron’s (1976)
suggestion that this construction first signals reportative evidence (and not a
cause) clearly seems to coincide with the data from the sample. Nonetheless, it
must be noted that this is only the case when the main subject’s identity does
not coincide with that of the speaker.
With non-first-person main predicates in Attic, hōs + participle is consis-
tently used when the information is ascribed to the subject of the main predi-
cate (forwhich the speaker bases himself on indirect evidence: hearsay [“claim-
ing that”] or inference [“based on the actions of the subject, they must be
believing that”]) and the speaker does not agree with the information offered
(lack of sc). With first person main predicates, the speaker himself constitutes
the information source. Non-completive hóti and háte generally indicate that
the speaker commits himself to the information, without necessarily having an
evidential side effect (evidential strategy). Table 5 provides an overview of the
use of these conjunctions by Plato.
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table 5 Overview of the use of háte/hóti and hōs in the sample
Adverbial clauses with moods of
Participial adverbial clauses main clause
háte: “in the light of the fact that”,
“since; because”
evidentiality: the speaker
commits himself to the
information and possibly marks
the information source as
personal
hóti: “because”
causes having the commitment
of the speaker or causes
presented neutrally
hōs: “claiming that”, “seeming to be
thinking that”
evidentiality: reportative or
inferential value with the
subject of the non-first-person
main predicate being the
information source; direct and
personal evidentiality with first
person main predicates
hōs: not attested in the sample; this
usage is rare in later Attic
prose36
As shown, theuse of different cases in complementizingpatterns has evidential
implications (4.2.). Similarly, the oppositions hóti vs. hōs + finite verbs and háte
vs. hōs + participle also seem to have evidential extensions in certain contexts
(mainly reportative, but also inferential). The precise extent of the evidential
value(s) of these conjunctions remains to be determined by more extensive
corpus research.
Summary: hōs + participle indicates that the main verb governing it is
to be taken as the information source for the contents of the participial
36 In Ionic and older Attic the use of non-completive hōs + finite verbs is more frequent
and has a value close to that of hōs + participle; see examples in Herodotus (cf. 1.79.2 in
note 33 above) and Thucydides (1.61.3: épeita dè ksúmbasin poiēsámenoi kaì ksummakhían
anagkaían pròs tòn Perdíkkan, hōs autoùs katḗpeigen hē Poteídaia kaì ho Aristeùs parelē-
luthṓs, apanístantai ek tês Makedonías).
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phrase, invoking a reportative evidential value and a lack of sc with non-
first-person main verbs. háte + participle refers to causes represented
as factual by the speaker. hóti + finite verb presents a cause neutrally
or possibly indicates the sc; no clear example of hōs + finite verbs was
found.
4.6 ADifficult Case: The Oblique Optative Revisited
Many analyses of the value of the oblique optative have been suggested. Mén-
dez Dosuna (1999) and Faure (2010; 2014) independently discuss the possibility
of an evidential value for the oblique optative. The latter seems to exclude it,
whereas the former seeks to confirm it. Both refer to the work of Basset (1984;
1986), without further elaborating upon his views. Some earlier twentieth-
century grammarians have arrived at an intuitive consensus regarding the
reportative character of the oblique optative. For reasons explained in Sec-
tion 2.4., they were not yet able to link this with the notion of evidentiality.
Smyth (1916: 336), for example, informs us that “causal clauses denoting an
alleged or reported reason take the optative after secondary tenses”.37 Kühner-
Gerth (1966: 548) offers a similar explanation for causal clauses. According
to these authors, the oblique optative is used to express “past thoughts and
speeches”, the original “potential semantics” of the optative being “completely
obscured” (Kühner-Gerth 1963: 254–255, where a parallel with the German
Konjunktiv ii is drawn). Neuberger-Donath (1983), on the other hand, suggests
that the oblique optative has a mirative value, a semantic category close to
evidentiality (cf. sub 2.1.). The Greek oblique optative is purported to indi-
cate that the speaker is surprised—post factum—at the information offered
in an instance of indirect speech. Because of this post factum character of the
speaker’s surprise, the oblique optative can only be used following the past
tense.38
37 By way of example, he cites Thucydides 2.21.3 as follows: (hoi Athēnaîoi) tòn Perikléa
ekákizdon hóti stratēgòs ṑn ouk epekságoi.
38 Regarding the examples in the sample, Neuberger-Donath’s (1983) mirative hypothe-
sis seems to be refuted by the following instances of oblique optative: 22b (légoien,
manthánoimi) and 22d (heurḗsoimi); a dubious case is lusiteloî in 22e. Consider, e.g.,
the case of heurḗsoimi in 22c–d: Teleutôn oûn epì toùs kheirotékhnas êia: emautôi gàr
sunḗidē oudèn epistaménōi hōs épos eipeîn, toútous dé g’ḗidē hóti heurḗsoimi pollà kaì
kalà epistaménous. Here, heurḗsoimi replaces an indicative future. It seems impossible
to contend that, within this context, Socrates is being surprised about his future find-
ings.
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Basset (1984; 1986) states that an oblique optative marks the source for the
whole proposition. Specifically, this modal construction delimits the source as
particular (personal judgments, arguments, and information), whereas other
moods mark more general sources (imposed judgments, natural arguments,
and public information) (Basset 1986: 110–111). Because the oblique optative
always occurs in subordinate clauses governed by past-tense main verbs, it is
described as an “escape from nynegocentrism” (< nûn and egṓ; Basset 1986: 111).
For it allows the speaker to put the contents of the proposition in a situation
removed in time from the speaker (an escape from the current moment: nûn)
and, possibly, entirely detached from his own person (an escape from the self:
egṓ). Thus, this use of the optative canbe seen as a deictic strategywith possible
evidential implications.
Starting fromananalysis of the sample (17 instances of oblique optatives),39 I
aimed to investigate the extent to which Basset’s hypothesis is tenable. His sug-
gestion (Basset 1986: 110–111) that the oblique optative expresses specific per-
sonal information, thoughts, or judgments appears to be an adequate approach
to the passages in the sample; cf., e.g., (23):
(23) kápeita
and.afterwards
epeirṓmēn
try:impf.mp.1sg
autôi
him:dat
deiknúnai
show:inf.pres
hóti
that
oíoito
believe:opt.pres.mp.3sg
mèn
prt
eînai
be:inf.pres
sophós,
wise:nom.sg
eíē
be:opt.pres.3sg
d’
prt
oú
neg
‘And afterwards I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but that
hewas not.’40
21c
The two oblique optatives are used to articulate the particular stance of the
speaker, which is clearly not shared by the person to whom the pronoun
“autôi” refers. On the one hand, the oblique optative seems to delineate the
source for the proposition; it delimits certain information from others and
endorses its particular character, whereas the indicative and the subjunctive
39 Cf. as 21a (2×), 21c (2×), 22a, 22b (2×), 22c (2×), 22d, 22e, 27e, 32c, 34c, 36c, and 40a and Cr
45b.
40 As one of the anonymous reviewers rightly pointed out, it would be worthwhile to inves-
tigate whether there is a correlation or interaction between the usage of optative oblique
constructions and the distribution of the complementizers hóti and hōs. This, however,
exceeds the scope of the present paper.
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generally convey commonly accepted views. On the other hand, the oblique
optative constitutes ameans for the speaker to distance himself from thewords
of the protagonist, which Basset (1984) calls “la dissociation énonciative”. The
speaker (“le centrage locutoral”) renounces the utterances of the protagonist
(“le centrage protagoniste”), who differs at least situationally from the speaker
and possibly on the basis of identity (for the terms centrage locutoral and
centrage protagoniste, see Basset 1999). Indeed, this seems to be an important
restriction on the use of the oblique optative; thismood can only be usedwhen
the contents of the proposition are represented from the point of view of the
protagonist as particular to someone else or to himself in a different (i.e. past)
situation (cf. Basset 1984).
The instances in the sample seem to point out that the oblique optative
constitutes a deictic strategy, “delimiting” the information, as is suggested by
Basset in several of his publications. The speaker distances himself in time
(and possibly in identity) from the subject of the main predicate. Because it
is often impossible to identify the speaker with the protagonist, a number of
early twentieth-century grammarians have attributed to the oblique optative
a value having a close resemblance to reportative evidentiality. This appears
to be too radical a generalization, which is based on a limited group of similar
examples. The semantics of this specific construction have a higher complex-
ity and do not simply denote reportative evidentiality. Thus, at most, this value
may be regarded as a contextually bound evidential connotation of the oblique
optative, but not as being part of its fundamental function (possible evidential
strategy). The complex interaction between the conceptual domain of eviden-
tiality and the use of the oblique optative as a narrative device is, however,
still in need of a thorough corpus-based investigation. Moreover, in analyzing
the instances in the sample, it is important to account for phenomena such
as the consecutio modorum and to determine the counterpart of the oblique
optative in case of a present tense main verb (indicative, subjunctive with án,
etc.).41 However, this does not lie within the scope of the present paper. In
any case, it is clear that the oblique optative signals that the speaker/narra-
tor in the hic et nunc moment of speaking/narrating does not vouch for the
information expressed by others or by himself in past contexts. This may be
regarded as an evidential overtone of the deictic function of the oblique opta-
tive.
41 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out the relevance of the consecutio
modorum for this discussion.
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Summary: Theobliqueoptative is said to be evidential in as far as it signals
that the speaker/narrator in thehic etnuncmomentof speaking/narrating
does not commit himself to the information expressed by others or by
himself in past contexts.
4.7 Evidential Values of Attic Auxiliaries
Just as is the case for Spanish auxiliaries (cf. Cornillie 2007 for a detailed
discussion & 2009: 51–54 for a case study of the hearsay meaning of parecer,
‘to seem’), Attic auxiliary constructions are commonly employed to express
evidential values.42 This more grammatical means is prominent in the sample.
Table 6 presents an overview of the evidential use of the Attic auxiliaries
dokéō, éoika, and phaínomai, whose evidential values are intertwined with the
construction in which they appear.
First, the inferential use seems to constitute the semantic core of dokéō
(cf. (24); it is the only one present in Homer) and is also attested in paren-
thetic phrases. In this case, dokéō is always constructed impersonally with a
first person dative personal pronoun (moi) and with an infinitive (if dokéō is
not utilized parenthetically). Second, the reportative use seems to be mainly
limited to attributive participial constructions with dokéō in the sample (cf.
(25); see also the intuitive analysis in Liddell-Scott-Jones 1940: sub voce). When
expressing this evidential value, dokéō is always followed by an infinitive, but
does not have a dative pronoun. Third, presumptive dokéō is attested five times
(cf. (26)), but it also appears in main clauses, where it is followed by an infini-
tive. Here, dokéō is always accompanied by a dative personal pronoun in the
first person, which is necessarily co-referential with the subject of dokéō [= the
speaker].
Inferential éoika is always followed by an infinitive in main clauses (with
the exception of elliptical parenthetic phrases; cf. (27)). However, if it is con-
struedwith a dative, it commonly has themeaning “to resemble”. It can be used
personally and impersonally in its evidential–inferential meaning. The con-
struction [phaínetai (+moi) + infinitive] (which is used personally and imper-
sonally) both expresses inferential evidentiality and indicates that the contents
of the following complement possess a higher degree of certainty compared to
the construction [dokeî + first person dative personal pronoun + infinitive]. If,
on the other hand, phaínomai is used in the first person, it receives a participa-
42 I consider an auxiliary to be a verb that is generally supplemented by another (main) verb,
towhich the auxiliary adds functional–semantic elements, such as tense, aspect,modality,
and evidentiality.
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tory value (with the evidence for the proposition being one’s own participation
in the action), the “demonstrative” semantics of the verb being predominant.
The verb is not an auxiliary in this value.
In summary, the semantics of éoika seem to allow only one evidential value,
i.e. inference. Moreover, phaínomai, depending on the grammatical person in
which it is used, encodes inferential and participatory evidentiality. dokéō can
have three different indirect evidential values, to wit, inferential, presumptive
(both personal), and reportative (non-personal). In the sample, the inferen-
tial value is used most frequently, which probably stems from the argumen-
tative nature of the text. The speaker uses the inferential auxiliary structure
with dokéō as the discursive strategy par excellence to relativize his own state-
ments.
Inferential evidentiality is part of the semantic core of these verbs—for
which typological parallels can be found in other, non-Indo-European lan-
guages; see, for example, the “secondary” verb awine/awa, “to seem”, in Jara-
wara.43 The other evidential values of dokéō and phaínomai may be derived
from the original inferential meaning. Diachronic research may shed light on
the evolutions these auxiliaries went through and on the interactions between
their different meanings.
Summary: dokéō, éoika, and phaínomai all express inferential eviden-
tiality. Inferential dokéō and phaínomai signal different degrees of epis-
temic certainty. In addition, dokéō is used tomark presumptive and repor-
tative evidentiality, depending on the construction in which it fig-
ures. phaínomai also reflects participatory semantics in certain con-
texts.
43 See Dixon (2004: 232–233) for the inferential value of this verb. Jarawara is an
Arawá language spoken in Amazonas, a western Brazilian state. The so-called secondary
verbs in Jarawara are part of the predicate, acting as grammatical elements that
complete the main verb but preserve an independent phonological status (Dixon 2004:
226).
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table 6 Overview of Attic auxiliaries and their evidential values in the sample
Value Occurrences
dokéō infr as: 20× & Cr: 10×
(24) tò
art
gàr
for
mḕ
neg
aiskhunthênai
be.ashamed:inf.aor.pass
hóti
that
autíka
immediately
hup’
by
emoû
me:gen
ekselegkhthḗsontai
refute:fut.pass.3pl
érgōi,
work:dat
epeidàn
when
mēd’
neg.emp
hopōstioûn
ever.so.little
phaínōmai
appear:subj.pres.mp.1sg
deinòs
clever:nom.sg
légein,
speak:inf.pres
toûtó
this:nom
moi
me:dat
édoksen
seem:aor.3sg
autôn
they:gen
anaiskhuntótaton
outrageous:superl.nom.sg
eînai
be:inf.pres
‘For the fact that they did not feel ashamed of being immediately refuted
by me actively, when I am shown to be in no way whatever clever at
speaking, that seemed to me to be their most outrageous feat, […].’
17b
dokéō rep only in as: 7×
(25) êlthon
go:aor.1sg
epí
to
tina
one:acc
tôn
art
dokoúntōn
seem:ptcp.pres.gen.pl
sophôn
wise:gen.pl
eînai
be:inf.pres
‘I went to one of those who are said to be wise, […].’
21b
dokéō presu as: 4× & Cr: 1×
(26) toûto
this:acc
humôn
you:gen.pl
déomai
beg:pres.mp.1sg
díkaion,
just:acc.sg
hṓs
as
gé
prt
moi
me:dat
dokô,
seem:pres.1sg
tòn
art
mèn
prt
trópon
way:acc
tês
art
lékseōs
speech:gen
eân
allow:inf.pres
‘[…] I ask this of you, [a] just [request],methinks, that is, to allowmyway
of speaking […].’
18a
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Value Occurrences
éoika infr as: 3× & Cr: 1×
(27) éoika
seem:perf.1sg
goûn
prt
toútou
him:gen
ge
prt
smikrôi
small:dat.sg
tini
one:dat
autôi
self:dat.sg
toútōi
this:dat
sophṓteros
wise:comp.nom.sg
eînai,
be:inf.pres
hóti
because
hà
which:acc.pl
mḕ
neg
oîda
know:perf.1sg
oudè
neg.emp
oíomai
believe:pres.mp.1sg
eidénai
know:inf.perf
‘At any rate, I seem to be wiser than him in precisely this small respect,
that is, because of the fact that I do not claim to knowwhat I do not know.’
21d
phaínomai infr44 as: 4× & Cr: 2×
(28) phaínetai
appear:pres.mp.3sg
toût’
this:acc
ou45
neg
légein
say:inf.pres
tòn
art
Sōkrátē,
Socrates:acc
proskekhrêsthai
abuse:inf.perf.mp
dè
prt
tôi
art
emôi
my:dat.sg
onómati
name:dat
‘[…] he appears not to say this about Socrates, but to abusemy name […].’
23a–b
phaínomai part as: 1× & Cr: 1×
Cf. (24)
44 Plato intuitively alludes to the inferential value of phaínetai in Sophista 264b: “ “phaínetai”
dè hò légomen súmmeiksis aisthḗseōs kaì dóksēs [“phaínetai” is what we call a mixture of
sense-perception and judgment].”
45 Here, I follow the text of the Loeb edition (Fowler-Lamb 2005 [1914]: 86).
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5 Conclusions and Outlook
By focusing on a number of particles, complementizer strategies, the oblique
optative, and auxiliaries in Attic, this paper has attempted to demonstrate
the importance of evidentiality as an integrative approach for the descrip-
tive analysis of Ancient Greek. Both evidential markers (e.g., ára and dḗpou)
and strategies (e.g., the uses of dokéō, complementizer strategies) are shown to
have been available in Attic. My tentative approach to evidentiality in Ancient
Greek is mainly based on the analysis of Socrates’ orations at his process, as
recounted in Plato’s as, an argumentative text with a peculiar ironic charac-
ter, in which inference is a prominent evidential value (expressed by several
particles and auxiliaries; cf. Bakker 2002: 213). However, other evidential values
are also present: presumptive (particles, an auxiliary), reportative (completive
constructions, an auxiliary, a conjunction + participle construction), quotative
(a complementizer, a defective verb), visual (completive constructions), and
participatory (a verbal construction) evidentiality. The oblique optative can
also be regarded as an evidential strategy in that the information it expresses
is attributed to another center of consciousness, different from the speaker
at least in time and possibly also in person (= epiphenomenon of its deictic
function). It is, however, difficult to label this interpretation with an exist-
ing evidential value. In order to formulate more generally valid statements
about the linguistic encoding of evidentiality in Ancient Greek on the whole, it
is necessary to investigate additional types of texts. Furthermore, it is essen-
tial to start from a well-defined methodology and to involve the diachronic
aspect in the research, as this can aid in illuminating the origins of eviden-
tial morphemes/strategies and in mapping out their evolutions. In summary, I
have attempted to sketch a linguistic–conceptual interpretative and integrative
framework with which to approach certain Attic morphemes and construc-
tions that are often intuitively understood by grammarians and linguists but
only seldom connected with the conceptual frame of evidentiality.
Abbreviations
1 1st person
2 2nd person
3 3rd person
acc accusative
aor aorist
art article
comp comparative
dat dative
emp emphatic (morpheme)
fut future
gen genitive
ger gerundive
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impf imperfect
inf infinitive
infr inferential (morpheme)
mid middle
mp medio-passive
neg negation
nom nominative
pass passive
part participatory
perf perfect
pl plural
pres present
presu presumptive
prt particle
ptcp participle
quot quotative marker
rep reportative
sg singular
subj subjunctive
superl superlative
voc vocative
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